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Revenue Ruling 79-292 and Deferred
Reporting
RICHARD L. MEvzs*
When a taxpayer sells property and receives a purchaser's
obligation in exchange, the Internal Revenue Service's new re-
porting rules for cash and accrual basis taxpayers result in in-
consistent applications of section 1001(b) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. In Revenue Ruling 79-292, the Service treats section
1001(b) as being modified by section 451's method of account-
ing rules; this position subsequently has been incorporated into
the temporary regulations under the Installment Sales Revi-
sion Act of 1980. The author argues that section 1001(b) oper-
ates independently of a taxpayer's method of accounting and
that the Service's position creates doctrinal disharmony in the
area of deferred reporting.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Revenue Ruling 79-292,1 the Internal Revenue Service ruled
that when an accrual basis taxpayer sells real property and re-
ceives a purchaser's long term note in exchange, the seller's ac-
counting method takes precedence over the language of section
1001(b)' in determining the amount to be realized. This holding
limits the availability of deferred reporting for accrual basis tax-
payers, while indirectly endorsing the expansion of deferred re-
porting for cash basis taxpayers.
Revenue Ruling 79-292 concerned an accrual basis taxpayer,
engaged in the business of constructing single family houses, that
sold a home for $40,000x. The buyer satisfied $30,000x of the
purchase price with a first mortgage loan from a bank. The
taxpayer financed the remainder of the buyer's obligation, taking
back a $10,000x second mortgage. No interest or principal pay-
ments were due on the second mortgage for fifteen years" and, as a
result, the obligation's $10,000z face value exceeded its fair market
value.
The ruling considered whether, under section 1001(b), the ac-
crual basis seller could defer realization of the excess of the second
mortgage's face value over its fair market value. In its analysis, the
Service examined the interplay between the fair market value limi-
1. 1979-2 C.B. 287.
2. I.R.C. § 1001(b) states in pertinent part: "Amount Realized.-The amount realized
from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received plus
the fair market value of the property (other than money) received."
All references and citations to sections in this article are to sections of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended to the date of publication, unless otherwise indicated.
All references and citations to regulations are to Treasury regulations under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended to the date of publication, unless otherwise indicated.
References to regulations under § 453, other than to the current temporary regulations
to that section, are to the versions in force immediately before the enactment of the Install-
ment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (codified at I.R.C. § 453).
3. Payments on the second mortgage commenced after satisfaction of the first
mortgage.
The Revenue Ruling also considered a second transaction where the taxpayer sold a
piece of construction equipment and received a purchaser's obligation payable two years in
the future. The Service accorded the same treatment to both transactions.
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tation in section 1001(b) and the method of accounting rule set out
in section 451(a).4 Section 1001(b) provides that "[t]he amount re-
alized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the
sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the prop-
erty (other than money) received."5 Neither section 1001 nor its
interpretive regulations refer to a seller's accounting method as a
factor in determining "amount realized." The Service ruled, how-
ever, that a taxpayer's method of accounting must be considered in
determining "amount realized" under section 1001(b) and thus re-
quired the taxpayer to realize the face value of the second mort-
gage in the year of the sale. The United States Treasury Depart-
ment has adopted Revenue Ruling 79-292's position in section
15A.453-1(d)(2) of the temporary regulations, promulgated under
the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 ("Installment SalesAct"9).6
This article will demonstrate that the Service made several er-
rors in Revenue Ruling 79-292. The Service construed section 1001
too broadly when it found that "[t]he provisions of section 1001 of
the Code apply to any sale. . . of property."7 The Service failed to
recognize the fundamental distinction between inventory and non-
inventory sales under the Code and, as a result, it relied on inap-
propriate authority to support its holding. Additionally, the Ser-
vice misinterpreted the relationship between section 1001(b) and
the method of accounting rules. This relationship will be examined
in light of the historical development of both section 1001(b) and
the installment method of deferred reporting.
The Service's position in Revenue Ruling 79-292 and section
4. Section 451(a) states:
General Rule.-The amount of any item of gross income shall be included in the
gross income for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless
under the method of accounting used in computing taxable income, such amount
is to be property accounted for as of a different period.
The regulations specify when income must be recognized under the cash and accrual
accounting methods: "Generally, under the cash receipts and disbursements method in the
computation of taxable income, all items which constitute gross income (whether in the
form of cash, property, or services) are to be included for the taxable year in which actually
or constructively received." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 215, 218.
"Generally, under an accrual method, income is to be included for the taxable year when all
the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof
can be determined with reasonable accuracy." Tress. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii), T.D. 7285,
1973-2 C.B. 163, 164.
5. I.R.C. § 1001(b).
6. Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (codified at
I.R.C. § 453).
7. 1979-2 C.B. at 288.
19821
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
15A.453-1(d)(2) of the temporary regulations creates doctrinal dis-
harmony in the area of deferred reporting. This article's thesis is
that section 1001(b) operates independently of a taxpayer's
method of accounting. Accrual and cash basis taxpayers should
thus treat a purchaser's obligation as an amount realized only to
the extent of the obligation's fair market value.8 The Service allows
cash basis taxpayers to report in this manner, but it requires ac-
crual basis taxpayers to treat the face value of a purchaser's obliga-
tion as an amount realized, claiming that the taxpayer's method of
accounting determines the amount to be realized under section
1001(b). The Service, however, apparently posits that a cash basis
taxpayer should treat a purchaser's obligation as an amount real-
ized to the extent of its fair market value even if that obligation is
not the equivalent of cash.' The Service has recognized that cash
equivalency is a valid attribute of the cash method of reporting.1 0
Revenue Ruling 79-219, if applied consistently to a cash basis tax-
payer, would permit the cash basis taxpayer to defer the recogni-
tion of gain if a purchaser's obligation was not the equivalent of
cash.
II. DEFERRED REPORTING
A brief preliminary review of deferred reporting will provide
the background information necessary for an understanding of
Revenue Ruling 79-292. If a taxpayer sells property and receives
consideration that exceeds his basis in the property, then he real-
izes gain to the extent of the excess. Deferred reporting postpones
recognition of income on a transaction and the resulting income
tax liability. There is theoretical justification for deferred report-
ing: (1) the seller may receive consideration for a sale over a period
of years, and as a result, he may not have enough cash in the year
of sale to meet his tax obligation on the entire realized gain, and
(2) the seller may receive consideration of such an indeterminate
value that it is not feasible to require the seller to compute a gain
or loss at the time of the sale.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 81-115.
9. See Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975), nonacq. 1980-1
C.B. 2 (nonacquiescence on another issue); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(i), T.D.
7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 308. For a discussion of the cash equivalency doctrine, see infra text
accompanying notes 119-127.
10. See Rev. Rul. 68-606, 1968-2 C.B. 42.
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A. Installment Method Treatment
Section 453 permits the installment method of deferred re-
porting, which is available to both cash basis and accrual basis tax-
payers. Under the installment method, if a taxpayer receives a
promise of future payment in exchange for property, he must post-
pone realization of gain until receipt of the future payments."
Generally, all sellers of real property and nondealer sellers of per-
sonal property qualify to report under the installment method if at
least one payment will be received after the close of the taxable
year in which the disposition occurs."' The seller only recognizes
gain on payments he actually receives during the year, and the
gain realized on each payment is limited to its proportionate share
of the gross profit as calculated on the entire contract price.' 8 In
essence, a portion of each payment received by the seller consti-
tutes gain and a portion represents recovery of the seller's basis.
B. Closed Transaction Treatment
Although fixed payments will be received in the future, a tax-
payer may elect under section 453(d) not to use the installment
method. When this occurs, both cash basis and accrual basis sellers
of real property and nondealer sellers of personal property deter-
mine their gain under section 1001."I Under section 1001(b), the
purchaser's future fixed payment obligation is treated as "property
(other than money)" 1' and gain or loss is calculated using the
11. I.R.C. § 453(a), (c). The taxpayer must report using the installment method unless
he affirmatively elects out of section 453. I.R.C. § 453(d).
12. I.R.C. § 453(b).
13. I.R.C. § 453(c). Section 453(c) only applies to gains; losses cannot be spread over a
period of years under the installment method. See Sacks v. Burnet, 66 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.
1933).
14. I.R.C. § 1001 provides in part:
(a) Computation of gain or los.-The gain from the sale or other disposi-
tion of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the
adjusted basis ....
(b) Amount realized.-The amount realized from the sale or other disposi-
tion of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market
value of the property (other than money) received.
15. A purchaser's obligation given directly to a seller is assumedly "property (other
than money)" within the meaning of § 1001(b). Cf. First Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner, 40 T.C. 474, 487 (1963); Haley, The Application of Section 1001 to Deferred Pay-
ment Sales of Property, 28 TAx LAw. 303, 318 n.70 (1975) (such obligations are cash
equivalents for accrual taxpayers).
This article adopts the position taken by the Service in the temporary regulations
under the Installment Sales Act. The regulations state that when a taxpayer elects not to
report on the installment method,
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property's fair market value. 16 To the extent that the obligations
are valued at less than their face amount, the seller defers gain
recognition.' The Service has permitted this method of deferring
gains, known as closed transaction treatment, only for cash method
taxpayers. Revenue Ruling 79-292 bars accrual basis taxpayers
from using this deferral method by holding that a taxpayer's
method of accounting supersedes the fair market valuation of sec-
tion 1001(b). An accrual basis taxpayer must report his gain by
including the face amount of the buyer's obligation. Thus, after
Revenue Ruling 79-292, only cash basis taxpayers can use this
closed transaction deferral method.1"
C. Open Transaction Treatment
A seller may also elect out of section 453, deferring even more
gain than he could defer under the installment method. This open
transaction treatment has traditionally been available in two sepa-
rate situations: (1) when the purchaser's obligation is of an indeter-
minate value because payments under the obligation are contin-
[rjeceipt of an installment obligation shall be treated as a receipt of property, in
an amount equal to the fair market value of the installment obligation, whether
or not such obligation is the equivalent of cash. An installment obligation is con-
sidered to be property. . . without regard to whether the obligation is embodied
in a note, an executory contract, or any other instrument, or is an oral promise
enforceable under local law.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(i), T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 308.
16. I.R.C. § 1001(b).
17. Subsequent collections on the obligation in excess of the fair market value will be
recognized as ordinary income when received. Under § 1232, however, collections on obliga-
tions issued by corporate and governmental bodies may produce capital gains.
18. The Service's position on this type of deferral is reiterated in Temporary Treasury
Regulation § 15A.453-1:
A taxpayer using the cash receipts and disbursements methods of accounting
shall treat as an amount realized in the year of sale the fair market value of the
installment obligation. . . . A taxpayer using the accrual method of accounting
shall treat as an amount realized in the year of sale the total amount payable
under the installment obligation.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(ii), T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 308. But see Treas.
Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(1) which states that for
sales of real property involving deferred payments in which the payments re-
ceived during the year of sale exceed 30 percent of the selling price, the obliga-
tions of the purchaser received by the vendor are to be considered as an amount
realized to the extent of their fair market value in ascertaining the profit or loss
from the transaction.
Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(1), T.D. 6314, 1958-2 C.B. 160, 167. For a discussion of the meaning
and origins of Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(1), see infra text accompanying notes 81-115. -The
temporary regulations under the Installment Sales Act do not contain a provision corre-
sponding to Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(1).
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gent on some unpredictable event,"9 and (2) when a cash basis
seller receives a purchaser's obligation that is not a cash
equivalent.' Under open transaction treatment, the taxpayer de-
fers the reporting of gain until he fully recovers his basis.21 If a
taxpayer receives a purchaser's future obligation with no ascertain-
able value, he can use open transaction deferred reporting treat-
ment regardless of his method of accounting."
In certain situations, a cash basis taxpayer may treat a trans-
action as open when he receives a purchaser's obligation with a
stated face value that is not a cash equivalent.2 The face amount
of the obligation renders the sales price determinate and precludes
the taxpayer from enjoying open transaction treatment under a
"no ascertainable value" theory. The cash basis taxpayer, however,
defers the reporting of gain because the purchaser's obligation is
not a cash equivalent. Cash equivalency open transaction treat-
19. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), contains the archetypical example of this
situation.
20. See Goldberg, Open Transaction Treatment for Deferred Payment Sales After the
Installment Sales Act of 1980, 34 TAx LAW. 605, 625 (1981); infra text accompanying notes
119-27. Conceptually, this situation is distinct from the situation in Burnet v. Logan, which
applies when the obligation has no ascertainable value. In this second situation, the value
may be ascertainable but other factors cause the obligation not to be the equivalent of cash.
21. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. at 412. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(2) provides:
If the obligations received by the vendor have no fair market value, the pay-
ments in cash or other property having a fair market value shall be applied
against and reduce the basis of the property sold and, if in excess of such basis,
shall be taxable to the extent of the excess. Gain or loss is realized when the
obligations are disposed of or satisfied, the amount thereof being the difference
between the reduced basis as provided in the preceding sentence and the
amount realized therefor. Only in rare and extraordinary cases does property
have no fair market value.
T.D. 6314, 1958-2 C.B. 160, 167.
Under the open transaction method, all of the gain retains the character applicable to
the underlying asset sold; i.e., if the asset is a capital asset, the gain recognized after the
basis is fully recovered is still considered capital gain. This is in contrast to the characteriza-
tion of collections in excess of basis under the closed method. See supra note 17.
22. See G.C.M. 1387, VI-1 C.B. 48 (1927), declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1
C.B. 307; Desmond, Sales of Property Under the Deferred-Payment Method, 32 TAxs 40,
43 & n.24 (1954); Giljum, A Lawyer's Primer on the Tax Treatment of Deferred Payment
Sales, 31 J. Mo. B. 471, 476 (1975); Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment, 30 TAx
L. Rev. 469, 560 (1975). The Committee Report accompanying the Installment Sales Act
appears, however, to misstate the law. See S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nows 4696, 4717-18; Goldberg, supra note 20, at
647-48.
23. Essentially, a purchaser's obligation is not considered to be a cash equivalent when
it cannot be readily converted to cash in an amount closely approximating its face value at
the time of the sale. For a more complete discussion of the cash equivalency doctrine, see
infra text accompanying notes 119-27.
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ment is an exception to the general cash basis reporting rule that
cash basis taxpayers report gain upon receipt of cash or property;"
a purchaser's obligation that is not a cash equivalent is deemed to
have no fair market value and the transaction is treated as open.25
Open transaction treatment in this situation is justified not be-
cause of difficulties in valuation, but rather because of the practical
difficulty of requiring a cash basis taxpayer to report income before
the receipt of cash. But open transaction treatment based on a lack
of cash equivalency may no longer be available, if it ever was prop-
erly applicable, as both the Senate Finance Committee Report ac-
companying the Installment Act and the temporary regulations
under section 453 limit open transaction treatment to circum-
stances which fit the "no ascertainable value" rationale.se
III. REVENUE RULING 79-292 ANALYZED
A. The Service's Reasoning
A breakdown of the analysis in Revenue Ruling 79-292 will
highlight the difficulties inherent in the Service's position. In arriv-
ing at its conclusion that section 1001(b) must be read in conjunc-
tion with the method of accounting rule of section 451, the Service
used the following logic: (1) Section 1001(b) applies to all sales of
property, including sales in the ordinary course of business and
casual sales;27 (2) it is a "well-established principle that an accrual
method taxpayer includes in income amounts which it has a right
to receive ' '26 (citing Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner);"
(3) "lClourts have consistently refused to allow accrual method
taxpayers to accrue only the fair market value of notes received
24. Under this exception, not only are payments not realized until received, but the full
basis in the property sold is recovered before any realization of gain.
25. Underlying this treatment of purchaser's obligations is the premise that the method
of accounting rule contained in § 451 modifies § 1001(b).
26. S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Ses. 1, 24, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4696, 4718; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(iii), T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296,
309.
27. Rev. Rul. 79-292 states:
The provisions of Section 1001 of the Code apply to any sale or other dispo-
sition of property. There are no indications either in this section or in its legisla-
tive history that its application was intended to be limited to a particular type of
sale. The regulations specify that section 1001 covers sales in the ordinary course
of a taxpayer's trade or business as well as casual sales.
1979-2 C.B. 287, 288.
28. Id.
29. 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
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upon a sale of property . ... ;0 and (4) section 1.453-6(a)(1) of
the regulations has been interpreted by the courts as inapplicable
to accrual basis taxpayers.81 As demonstrated below, the Service's
position on each of these four points is open to question.
B. The Scope of Section 1001(b)
The taxpayer in Revenue Ruling 79-292 was a dealer in real
property and the Service properly determined that the taxpayer
should have calculated its gain on the sale according to section
1001. The Service's statement that section 1001 applies to any sale
of property, however, construes the scope of the section too
broadly. Section 1001 does not apply to personal property sales
made in the ordinary course of business by dealers;s instead, Code
section 6138 and sections 1.61-3(a)"4 and 1.446-1(a)(4)(i)" of the
regulations govern income reporting for these inventory sales. Sec-
tion 1001 provides, however, the appropriate provisions for calcu-
lating gains on dealer sales of real property because real property
is not considered inventory for federal income tax purposes."
Dealers in personal property compute gains under section 61.
Section 1.61-3(a) of the regulations deals with business income
under section 61(a)(2)87 and states thatl"[i]n a manufacturing [or]
merchandising . . . business, 'gross income' means the total sales,
less the cost of goods sold . . ... "s Section 1.446-1(a)(4)(i) of the
regulations provides that in business involving the "production,
purchase, or sale of merchandise," inventories must be used in
computing taxable income.' Additionally, if the business main-
tains inventories, the business must use the accrual method of ac-
counting. 40As the above quoted provisions indicate, taxpayers com-
30. Rev. Rul. 79-292, 1979-2 C.B. at 288.
31. Id. at 289.
32. Section 1001 is generally recognized as being inapplicable to inventory sales. D.
HERwITz, BUSINESS PLANNING 491-92 (1966); 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H.
AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS 867 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
SURREY & WARREN]; see Ginsberg, supra note 22, at 567-68; Levin & Javaras, Receipt of
Notes and Other Rights to Future Payments by a Cash-Basis Taxpayer, 54 A.B.A. J. 405,
406 n.16 (1968).
33. I.R.C. § 61.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163, 164.
35. Tress. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(4)(i), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 215, 218.
36. Rev. Rul. 69-536, 1969-2 C.B. 109.
37. I.R.C. § 61(a)(2).
38. Tress. Reg. § 1.61-3(a), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163, 164.
39. Tress. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(4)(i), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 215, 218.
40. Tress. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(i), T.D. 6282, 1958-1 C.B. 215, 219.
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pute gains arising from inventory sales by subtracting the cost of
goods sold from the total amount of sales. This method of calculat-
ing gain inherently differs from section 1001's calculation, which is
based on amount realized and adjusted basis. Valuing inventories
at the lower of cost or market"' and costing under the full absorp-
tion method 4' have no counterpart in the determination of a prop-
erty's adjusted basis.
Thus, contrary to the position taken in Revenue Ruling 79-
292, section 1001(b) only applies to casual sales of personal prop-
erty and all sales of real property. Section 1001(b) does not apply
to sales of personal property by a dealer in the ordinary course of
business.
C. The Relevance of Spring City
Citing Spring City Foundary Co. v. Commissioner, the Service
next contended that "treating a note received as property under
section 1001(b) of the Code and valuing it at fair market value is
inconsistent with the well-established principle that an accrual
method taxpayer includes in income amounts which it has a right
to receive. "4 Spring City does not support this proposition. In
Spring City, a taxpayer sold personal property in the ordinary
course of business and received unsecured notes in exchange. Later
that year, the purchaser had a bankruptcy petition filed against it.
The taxpayer argued, inter alia, that aside from any question of a
bad debt deduction, it should not have included the sales in in-
come because of the uncollectible debt. The United States Su-
preme Court, in response to this argument, formulated the well
known rule that for accrual basis taxpayers "it is the right to re-
ceive and not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of
41. Tress. Reg. § 1.471-2(c), T.D. 6336, 1958-2 C.B. 176, 178.
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11 (1973).
43. See I.R.C. §§ 1011-1012, 1016 and the regulations thereunder.
44. The predecessors to the regulations which distinguish inventory sales from casual
sales of personal property can be found in Regulation 45 to the Revenue Act of 1918, T.D.
2831, 21 Trees. Dec. Int. Rev. 170 (1919), reprinted in 134 INTERNAL REVENU. AcTs OF THE
UNITED STATES 1909-1950 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIEs, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DocuMENTS
(B. Reams, Jr. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Reams]. Specifically, the following articles of
Regulation 45 show that § 1001 and its predecessors do not apply to inventory sales: art. 23
(bases of computation (of net income)) (as amended 1919), art. 24 (methods of accounting),
art. 35 (gross income from business), and art. 1581 (need of inventories). Clearly, § 1001 and
its predecessors have never applied to inventory sales.
45. 1979-2 C.B. 287, 288 (citing Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182
(1934)).
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the amount in gross income.' '' e The Revenue Ruling however ig-
nores the Court's emphasis that this rule is derived from the regu-
lations, which require merchandising and manufacturing busi-
nesses to keep inventories and compute gross income from "total
sales, less the cost of goods sold.' 14 The Court stated:
On an accrual basis, the "total sales," to which the regula-
tion refers, are manifestly the accounts receivable arising from
the sales, and these accounts receivable, less the cost of the
goods sold, figure in the statement of gross income. If such ac-
counts receivable become uncollectible, in whole or part, the
question is one of the deduction which may be taken according
to the applicable statute. . . . That is the question here."
As previously demonstrated," section 1001(b) does not govern
sales in the ordinary course of business in which inventories must
be maintained. Thus, the valuation of a note by an accrual basis
taxpayer at its fair market value under section 1001(b) does not
conflict with Spring City's "well-established principle" because
Spring City only applies to inventory sales of personal property.
D. Other Precedents
The Service next stated in the Revenue Ruling that "[t]he
courts have consistently refused to allow accrual method taxpayers
to accrue only the fair market value of notes received upon a sale
of property. . ... -6 In support of this statement, the Service cited
Jones Lumber Co. v. Commissioner," George L. Castner Co. v.
Commissioner,5 ' and First Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner." These cases, however, predicate their holdings on Spring
City or other cases outside of the scope of section 1001 and thus do
not apply to the situation considered in Revenue Ruling 79-292.
In First Savings the Tax Court based its holding that an ac-
crual basis seller -of real property must value purchaser's notes at
face value on Spring City and Key Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner."
As previously discussed, Spring City is only relevant in an inven-
46. 292 U.S. 182, 184 (1934).
47. Id. at 185 (quoting Reg. 45, art. 35 (1918)).
48. Id. (citations omitted).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 32-44.
50. 1979-2 C.B. at 288.
51. 404 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1968).
52. 30 T.C. 1061 (1958).
53. 40 T.C. 474 (1963).
54. 30 T.C. 109. (1958), affd per curiam, 271 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1959).
19821
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tory context. In Key Homes section 1001(b)'s fair market value
language was not at issue; rather, the court considered whether
money held by a mortgagee in a restricted savings account consti-
tuted income to the seller.
Castner concerned a casual sale of personal property. The Tax
Court erroneously relied on Spring City in holding that an accrual
method taxpayer cannot accrue notes at fair market value when
making a casual sale of personal property.55 A casual sale of per-
sonal property is not an inventory sale, and therefore the Spring
City rule should not have been applied to the section 1001(b) issue.
The court in Jones Lumber essentially relied on the Castner deci-
sion for its holding that an accrual taxpayer cannot accrue notes at
fair market value.56
Other case law supports an interpretation of section 1001(b)
contrary to that expressed in Revenue Ruling 79-292. In C.W.
Titus, Inc. v. Commissioner," the Board of Tax Appeals, on its
first hearing of the case, found that an accrual basis taxpayer must
include the face value of a purchaser's obligations as an amount
realized, regardless of its fair market value. Upon rehearing, how-
ever, the board found that it had erroneously held that the use of
the taxpayer's accounting method determined the inclusion issue.
The board further held that an accrual method taxpayer can re-
port gain according to the method prescribed in the predecessor to
regulation section 1.453-6(a)(1)." The board noted that the Com-
missioner did not question the availability of fair market value re-
porting, and that the issue had been originally raised by the
board."9
E. Section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the Regulations
Regulation 1.453-6(a)(1) appears to allow an accrual basis
seller of real property to report a purchaser's obligation at fair
55. 30 T.C. at 1069.
56. 404 F.2d at 766.
57. 33 B.T.A. 928 (1936), appeal dismissed, 88 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1937).
58. For a discussion of the origins of Tress. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(1), see infra text accom-
panying notes 85-102.
59. 33 B.T.A. at 929-30. In other cases involving purchasers' obligations, but which did
not directly address the § 1001 issue, courts have also regarded the taxpayer's accounting
method as not determinative of the amount to be realized. See, e.g., Waukesha Malleable
Iron Co. v. Commissioner, 67 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1933) (accrual basis seller allowed to defer
receipt of option payment until option period ended); Woodmar Realty Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 17 B.T.A. 88 (1929) (accrual basis taxpayer allowed to defer installment obligation
with no fair market value).
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market value rather than face value.60 In Revenue Ruling 79-292,
however, the Service held that the regulation does not apply to ac-
crual basis taxpayers. The Service cited Western Oaks Building
Corp. v. Commissioners' as the sole authority for its position. In
Western Oaks the Tax Court relied on Spring City, First Savings
& Loan, and Castner in finding that the accrual basis seller of real
property must accrue the face amount of savings and loan shares.
In footnote 4 of the Western Oaks decision, the court acknowl-
edged the existence of section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the regulations,
noted that the parties did not argue the regulation's applicability,
and stated that "[iun any event, we interpret [section 1.453-6(a)(1)
of the regulations] as being inapplicable to accrual method
taxpayers."12
Western Oaks has been criticized on this points3 and several
commentators take the position that the regulation's fair market
value limitation applies irrespective of the taxpayer's accounting
method.64 Curiously, the Castner opinion, cited in Western Oaks,
indicated in dicta that the regulation applied to accrual basis sell-
ers of real property.65
It seems clear from the above analysis that the authority cited
in Revenue Ruling 79-292 does not support the Service's conclu-
sion. The more far-reaching aspect of the ruling, however, is the
Service's assertion that "[t]here are no indications either in [sec-
tion 1001] or in its legislative history that its application was in-
tended to be limited to a particular type of sale.""
60. Tress. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(1), T.D. 6314, 1958-2 C.B. 160, states:
In transactions included in paragraph (b)(2) of § 1.453-4, that is, sales of
real property involving deferred payments in which the payments received dur-
ing the year of the sale exceed 30 percent of the selling price, the obligations of
the purchaser received by the vendor are to be considered as an amount realized
to the extent of their fair market value in ascertaining the profit or loss from the
transaction.
Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
61. 49 T.C. 365 (1968).
62. Id. at 372 n.4.
63. Ginsburg criticizes Western Oaks but fails to explain the basis of his disagreement.
Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 557 n.259.
64. See, e.g., Levin & Javaras, supra note 32, at 406; Llewellyn, Promises to Pay in the
Future-A Modest Proposal for Reform, 31 U. MAMi L. Rev. 1337, 1340 (1977). But see
Haley, supra note 15, at 320.
65. 30 T.C. at 1068. Also, Jones Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 764, 766 (6th
Cir. 1968), appears to take a similar position with regard to § 1.453-6(a)(1) of the
regulations.
66. Rev. Rul. 79-292, 1979-2 C.B. 287, 288.
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCOUNTING METHOD AND
SECTION 1001
A. Section 1001's Legislative History
Section 1001(b)'s legislative history supports the conclusion
that the section's fair market value language applies regardless of
the taxpayer's accounting method. The following discussion will
demonstrate that section 1001(b)'s present purpose is to measure
the amount to be used in calculating a gain or loss after a realiza-
tion event occurs. The Code does not explicitly define what consti-
tutes a realization event; the parameters of realization have been
developed by case law. When realization occurs, section 1001(b)
operates as a measurement device. Sections 1001(b) and 451 oper-
ate independently; a taxpayer's method of accounting is irrelevant
to section 1001(b)'s operation. Section 1001(b) can affect timing,
but only in a tangential way: if an item is unmeasurable, or if an
item is only to be measured to the extent of its fair market value,
section 1001(b) will affect the timing of the recognition and cause a
deferral.
The earliest version of section 1001(b) appeared as section
202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918.67 Section 202(b) stated, "When
property is exchanged for other property, the property received in
exchange shall for the purpose of determining gain. . . be treated
as the equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if
any ..... ."6 Section 202(b) differed, however, from section
1001(b) in an important respect, as the following interpretive regu-
lation illustrates:
Gain . . . arising from the acquisition and subsequent dis-
position of property is realized when as the result of a transac-
tion between the owner and another person the property is con-
verted into cash or into property (a) that is essentially different
from the property disposed of and (b) that has a market value.
In other words, both (a) a change in substance and not merely in
form, and (b) a change into the equivalent of cash, are required
to complete or close a transaction from which income may be
realized."
Section 202(b) thus described the circumstances under which the
67. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919) (current version
codified at I.R.C. § 1001(b)).
68. Id.
69. Tress. Reg. 45, art. 1563, T.D. 2831, 21 Tress. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 393 (1919) (em-
phasis added), reprinted in 134 Reams, supra note 44.
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taxing authority would find that income was to be realized.
In the Revenue Act of 1921, section 202(b) was amended and
renumbered as section 202(c). The revised section read, "[flor the
purposes of this title, on an exchange of property . . . for any
other . . . property, no gain . . . shall be recognized unless the
property received in exchange has a readily realizable market value
.... ,,10 The accompanying Senate Finance Committee report
stated:
The existing [1918] law makes a presumption in favor of
taxation. The proposed act [referring to section 202(c)] modifies
that presumption by providing that in the case of an exchange
of property for property no gain ... shall be recognized unless
the property received in exchange has a readily realizable mar-
ket value .... 7
The section's emphasis shifted from realization to recognition; the
modifying phrase "readily realizable" excluded certain receipts
from taxation that presumably were taxable under the 1918 Act.7
Income realization and recognition were hotly debated issues
in the early years of the federal income tax.7 A commentator in
1923 argued that the 1921 Act's "readily realizable" language was
no more than Congress's attempt to force the Internal Revenue
Service into a proper interpretation of section 202(b) under the
1918 Act.74 He argued that the use of the phrase "equivalent of
cash" in section 202(b) was meant to include
property recognized as a medium of exchange .... It no doubt
70. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (current version codified at
I.R.C. § 1001(b)).
71. S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1921), reprinted in 95A Reams, supra
note 44.
72. See Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1564, T.D. 3295, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 207, 498 (1922),
reprinted in 136 Reams, supra note 44, which states in part:
Gain or loss arising from the acquisition and subsequent disposition of
property is realized only when as the result of a transaction between the owner
and another person the property is converted into other property (a) that is
essentially different from the property disposed of, and (b) that has a readily
realizable market value. Property has a readily realizable market value if it can
be readily converted into an amount of cash or its equivalent substantially equal
to the fair value of the property. In other words, the property received in ex-
change must be readily marketable at substantially its fair value in order that
a gain or loss be recognized.
(emphasis added).
73. See generally Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (stock dividend not income
within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment).
74. Satterlee, Treatment of Exchanges of Property for Income Taxation, TAxEs, Dec.
1923, at 5, 8.
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includes United States Government bonds. It probably includes
stocks and securities and commodities actively dealt in in large
amounts.. . .It does not include much more. It does not in-
clude stock which my banker will not freely accept as collateral,
for if such stock were the equivalent of cash, he would not hesi-
tate. It does not include real estate which upon being put on the
market may possibly be sold in a day, but just as possibly not
for a month or longer. In short, it does not include property the
possession of which would not be a sure protection against that
kind of bankruptcy which sometimes happens to persons whose
assets exceed their liabilities, but who are unable quickly to turn
them into cash. If property is the equivalent of cash, it must be
liquid and for all practical purposes as good as cash.75
The Revenue Act of 1924 amended section 202(c), deleting the
"readily realizable" market value language and substituting the
present language of section 1001(b): "The amount realized from
the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any
money received plus the fair market value of the property (other
than money) received. ' '7 6 The report of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee expressly pointed out the changed purpose of section
202(c):
Subdivision (c) does not correspond to any provision of the
existing law but embodies in the law what is and has always
been the contruction of the law adopted by the department and
by the courts; that is, that where income is realized in the form
of property the measure of the income is the fair market value
of the property at the date of its receipt.7
The House Report contains almost identical language. 78 Congress,
75. Id. at 8.
76. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202(c), 43 Stat. 253, 256 (current version codified at
I.R.C. § 1001(b)).
77. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 68TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STATEMENT OF THE CHANGES
MADE IN THE REVENUE ACT OF 1921 BY H.R. 6715, AND THE REASONS THEREFOR 4 (Comm.
Print 1924), reprinted in 67 Reams, supra note 44 (emphasis added).
78. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924), reprinted in 96 Reams, supra
note 44, states:
Subdivision (c) does not correspond to any provision of the existing law but
embodies in the law what is the correct construction of the existing law; that is,
that where income is realized in the form of property, the measure of the income
is the fair market value of the property at the date of its receipt.
The existing law provides, in section 202(c), that no gain or loss is recog-
nized (that is, considered for the purpose of determining taxable income) from
an exchange of property unless the property received in exchange has a readily
realizable market value.
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in the 1924 Act, abandoned its earlier attempt to define a realiza-
tion or recognition event and instead left this challenge to the Ser-
vice and the courts. The congressional reports make it clear that
section 202(c) of the 1924 Act measured the amount of gain, not
whether a gain was realized or recognized. The use of money plus
the fair market value of property as a measuring rule, while having
no predecessor in the prior revenue acts, had nonetheless been
consistently applied.
An analysis of the predecessors of section 1001(b) leads to sev-
eral conclusions relevant to the question whether section 1001(b)
operates without regard to a taxpayer's accounting method. In the
Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921, Congress attempted to define
when an income realization event occurred for noninventory
sales.79 Such attempts to define realization of income by statute
necessarily meant that Congress did not consider financial ac-
counting rules for noninventory sales adequate to define when in-
come should have been deemed realized for tax purposes. Consis-
tent with this rejection of financial accounting rules for defining
income realization, the 1918 and 1921 statutes combined a mea-
surement rule with a realization rule, both independent of account-
ing methods. The 1924 statute, by abandoning a definition of real-
ization, became a rule solely for measuring income, independent of
a taxpayer's accounting method.80
B. Section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the Regulations and Section 1001
1. INTRODUCTION
Section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the regulations and its predecessors
lend support to the thesis that section 1001 operates indepen-
dently from a taxpayer's method of accounting. Section 1.453-
6(a)(1) of the regulations specifies that for deferred payments sales
of real property which are not reported under the installment
method, "the obligations of the purchaser received by the vendor
are to be considered as an amount realized to the extent of their
fair market value in ascertaining the profit or loss from the trans-
The provision is so indefinite that it can not be applied with accuracy, nor
with consistency.
79. Section 1001(b) and its predecessors do not apply to inventory sales made in the
ordinary course of business. See supra text accompanying notes 32-44. When the accrual
method is necessitated by the keeping of inventories, the method itself defines when income
is being realized.
80. See Goldberg, supra note 20, at 636.
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action.""1 The regulation makes no mention of a taxpayer's ac-
counting method as affecting the regulation's operation and it ap-
pears to restate section 1001(b)'s language in the purchaser's
obligation context.
The regulation has been used as authority for accrual basis
sellers of realty to report the receipt of a purchaser's obligation at
its fair market value.as Revenue Ruling 79-292, however, rejected
this argument.68 This controversy can be resolved by determining
how section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the regulations and its predecessor
regulations interpret section 1001(b) and its predecessor statutes
when a seller receives an obligation of the purchaser. The answer
to this question requires the resolution of several other issues: (1)
Why is the regulation placed among the installment sales regula-
tions; (2) Does the regulation only apply to a seller who cannot
qualify for installment sale treatment or can a seller who qualifies,
but does not elect to use section 453 (as in effect before the Install-
ment Sales Act), rely on this regulation; (3) Can the regulation be
applied to sales of personal property or is it limited to real prop-
erty transactions, as it appears to be on its face; and (4) Does this
regulation establish any additional authority for an accrual basis
taxpayer to accrue obligations of a purchaser at fair market value,
instead of face, if the regulation merely repeats the language of
section 1001(b)?" An understanding of the historical development
of the installment regulations is a prerequisite to determining the
force and scope of section 1.453-6(a)(1).
2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTALLMENT REGULATIONS
The Revenue Act of 1918 did not provide for the installment
method of reporting8' because the Service had assured the legisla-
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(1), T.D. 6314, 1958-2 C.B. 160, 167.
82. See George L. Castner Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1061 (1958) (by implication);
see also Jones Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1968); 1 SURREY & WAR-
REN, supra note 32, at 868. Contra Western Oaks Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 365
(1968); see also Desmond, supra note 22, at 41; Giljum, supra note 22, at 477.
83. 1979-2 C.B. 287, 289.
84. Other commentators have raised, but left unanswered, the same issues. D. HERwrrz,
supra note 32, at 491-97; Giljum, supra note 22, at 477. Another commentator attempted to
answer these questions, but was, in this author's opinion, unsuccessful. See Haley, supra
note 15, at 318-21.
85. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 212(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1064-65 (1919), states:
The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual
accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the case may be) in accor-
dance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of
such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has been so employed, or if
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tive committees that section 212(b) authorized the Service to issue
the appropriate regulations."6 Articles 42 through 46 of Regulation
45,87 promulgated by the Treasury Department under section
213(a) of the 1918 Act,s comprised the first comprehensive at-
tempt to provide for an installment method of reporting." Article
42 applied only to personal property sales, while articles 43
through 46 applied to real property sales.
Article 44 defined when deferred payment sales of realty qual-
ified for installment sales treatment" and article 45 provided the
rules of reporting when the taxpayer qualified for installment
treatment under article 44. 91 Additionally, article 45 permitted tax-
the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall
be made upon such basis and in such manner as in the opinion of the Commis-
sioner does clearly reflect the income.
86. Doyle, Taxation of Income Derived from Installment Sales, 4 TAXES 53, 54-56
(1926).
87. Tress. Reg. 45, arts. 42-46, T.D. 2831, 21 Tress. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 184-86 (1919).
88. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065 (1919), reads:
That for the purposes of this title (except as otherwise provided in section
233) the term "gross income"-
(a) Includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or com-
pensation for personal service. . . of whatever kind and in whatever form paid,
or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings
in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or
interest in such property .... The amount of all such items shall be included
in the gross income for the taxable year in which received . . . unless, under
methods of accounting permitted under subdivision (b) of section 212, any such
amounts are to be properly accounted for as of a different period ....
89. Tress. Reg. 33, art. 117, T.D. 2690, 20 Tress. Dec. Int. Rev. 126, 187 (1918), re-
printed in 132 Reams, supra note 44, constituted the Treasury's previous attempt to pro-
vide for installment reporting. The Treasury issued the regulation in January 1918, but be-
cause it was incomplete, it received little use. Doyle, supra note 86, at 53-54.
90. Tress. Reg. 45, art. 44, T.D." 2831, 21 Tress. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 185 (1919), re-
printed in 134 Reams, supra note 44, provided in part:
Deferred payment sales of real estate ordinarily fall into two classes when
considered with respect to the terms of sale, as follows:
(1) Installment transactions, in which the initial payment is relatively small
(generally less than one-fourth of the purchase price) and the deferred payments
usually numerous and of small amount ...
(2) Deferred payment sales not on the installment plan, in which there is a
substantial initial payment (ordinarily not less than one-fourth of the purchase
price), deferred payments being secured by a'mortgage or other lien. Such sales
'are distinguished from sales on the installment plan by the substantial character
of the initial payment and also usually by a relatively small number of deferred
payments.
91. Tress. Reg. 45, art. 45, T.D. 2831, 21 Tress. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 185-86 (1919), re-
printed in 134 Reams, supra note 44, provided in part: "[T]he vendor may report as his
income from [installment] transactions in any year that proportion of each payment actu-
ally received in that year which the gross profit to be realized when the property is paid for
bears to the gross contract price."
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payers who qualified for the installment method to, in essence,
elect not to report under the installment method." Article 46 thus
applied both for taxpayers who elected out and in situations where
the sale of real estate did not qualify for installment treatment.
Article 46 specified how a taxpayer would measure his gain upon
the receipt of a purchaser's obligation from the sale of real estate:
"These obligations for deferred payments are therefore to be re-
garded as equivalent to cash, and the profit indicated by the en-
tire consideration is taxable income for the year in which the ini-
tial payment was made and the obligations assumed."a' This
regulation was an interpretation of section 202(b) of the 1918 Rev-
enue Act, and was not a separate rule formulated by the Treasury
Department to govern the reporting of gain from the receipt of
purchaser obligations.'
The link between the regulation and the Code section is indi-
cated by the fact that as Congress subsequently amended section
202(b), the language of article 46 underwent similar modifications.
Following the 1921 Act, the Treasury added section 202(c)'s9a
"readily realizable market value" language to article 46." In 1927,
92. Article 45 provided:
If the taxpayer chooses as a matter of settled practice consistently followed
to treat the obligations of the purchaser as equivalent to cash and to report the
profit derived from the entire consideration, cash and deferred payments, as in-
come for the year when the sale is made, this is permissible. If so treated the
rule prescribed in article 46 will apply.
Tress. Reg. 45, art. 45, T.D. 2831, 21 Tress. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 185-86 (1919), reprinted in
134 Reams, supra note 44.
93. Tress. Reg. 45, art. 46, T.D. 2831, 21 Tress. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 186 (1919), re-
printed in 134 Reams, supra note 44 (emphasis added). The italicized phrases seem to re-
quire that the full face amount of the purchaser's obligation be included in income in the
year of sale. Haley so concluded, using the rationale that the obligations are worth their face
value because of the substantial down payment. Haley, supra note 15, at 319-20. Although
Haley correctly recognized that article 45 applied § 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 to the
receipt of purchaser's obligations, he did not stress that article 46's "equivalent to cash"
language provided a shortened version of § 202(b)'s realization rule: "[P]roperty received in
exchange shall . . . be treated as the equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market
value, if any . . . ." Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919) (em-
phasis added). The important point is that article 46, because it applied § 202(b), did not
require that the face amount of a purchaser's obligation be recognized in the year of the
sale; rather, the obligations were only recognized to the extent of their fair market values.
94. As discussed earlier, § 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 was a predecessor to
§ 1001(b). See supra text accompanying notes 67-80. Article 46 was not a separate rule
formulated by the Service; rather, it was derived from § 202(b).
95. Section 202(b) was republished as § 202(c) in the 1921 Act. See supra text accom-
panying note 70.
96. Tress. Reg. 62, art. 46, T.D. 3295, 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 207, 228 (1922), re-
printed in 136 Reams, supra note 44, provided in part: "If these obligations [of the pur-
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following a change in section 202(c)'s' 7 language, the Treasury re-
placed article 46's "readily realizable market value" words with
"fair market value." 8
In 1926 article 46 was again amended to conform better to sec-
tion 202(c)'s language.9 Section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the regulations
succeeded article 46 and replaced the "equivalent to cash" lan-
guage of the 1926 version with the current "amount realized"
wording.100 Clearly, section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the regulations and its
predecessors have followed the changing language of section
1001(b) and its predecessor statutes; section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the
regulations simply interprets section 1001(b) when a seller receives
a purchaser's obligation.
The reason for placing regulation 1.453-6(a)(1) within the in-
stallment sales regulations can best be explained through an exam-
ination of its historical development. In the Revenue Act of 1926,
Congress first added a separate statutory provision, section 212(d),
for installment reporting.10' Articles 42 and 44 were amended to
make specific reference to section 212(d).' 0 ' This later codification
of the installment method and the retention of the major portion
of section 202(c)'s installment regulations, articles 42 through 46,
explains mechanically why section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the regulations
appears among the installment regulations rather than grouped
chaser] have a readily realizable market value . . . they are to be considered as the
equivalent of cash and the profit realized from the transaction is taxable income for the year
in which the initial payment was made and the obligation assumed." (emphasis added).
97. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202(c), 43 Stat. 253, 256 (current version codified at
I.R.C. § 1001(b)).
98. Treas. Reg. 65, art. 46, T.D. 3640, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 745, 746 (1924), re-
printed in 137 Reams, supra note 44, provided in part: "If these obligations [of the pur-
chaser] have a fair market value, they are to be considered as the equivalent of cash and the
profit realized from the transaction is taxable income for the year in which the initial pay-
ment was made and the obligation assumed." (emphasis added).
99. Section 202(c) of the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 256, was carried forward
unchanged into § 202(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9, 12, and continued to be
reenacted with the pertinent language remaining unchanged through its current designation
as § 1001(b).
Treas. Reg. 69, art. 46, T.D. 3922, 28 Tress. Dec. Int. Rev. 558, 577 (1926), reprinted in
137 Reams, supra note 44, provided in part: "[O]bligations of the purchaser received by the
vendor are to be considered as the equivalent of cash to the amount of their fair market
value in ascertaining the profit or loss from the transaction." (emphasis added).
100. Tress. Reg. § 1.453-6(a)(1), T.D. 6314, 1958-2 C.B. 160, 167; see supra note 18 for
the relevant language of this provision.
101. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 9, 23 (current version codified at
I.R.C. § 453).
102. Treas. Reg. 69, arts. 42, 44, T.D. 3922, 28 Tress. Dec. Int. Rev. 558, 574-77 (1926),
reprinted in 137 Reams, supra note 44.
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under section 1001.
In determining whether section 1.453-6(a)(1) only applies to a
seller who fails to qualify for installment sale treatment, the above
historical discussion is applicable.108 Article 46, the predecessor to
section 1.453-6(a)(1), explicitly controlled situations in which sell-
ers elected not to use the installment reporting method. 1"4 Section
1001(b) applies to sales in which the seller qualifies for installment
reporting but elects not to use that method. This statute does not
distinguish between those situations in which a taxpayer qualifies
for, but elects out of the installment method, and those in which
he fails to qualify for its use under the rules applicable before the
Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980.105 For these reasons, sec-
tion 1.453-6(a)(1) clearly also applied to sellers who qualified for
installment sale treatment but did not elect to use section 453.
If section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the regulations merely applies sec-
tion 1001(b) to the receipt of a purchaser's obligations, then the
regulation should be applicable to casual sales of personal property
because section 1001(b) makes no distinction between casual sales
of personal property and sales of real property. The absence of a
regulation similar to section 1.453-6(a)(1) dealing with casual sales
of personal property can be attributed to the installment regula-
'tions' development by a process of amendment. The regulations is-
sued under the Revenue Act of 1918 did not contain a separate
article for personal property sales not qualifying for installment
method reporting, as did article 46 for real property sales.'"s This
omission explains the absence of a comparable regulation in the
later regulations as amended. The absence of a separate regulation
probably resulted from the 1918 regulation's emphasis on personal
property sales by dealers and the lack of a distinction between cas-
ual sales and sales by a dealer.10 7
103. See supra text accompanying notes 85-100.
104. For the relevant language of article 46, see supra text accompanying note 93.
105. The Installment Sales Act renders this issue practically moot; today there are very
few situations in which a seller of real property would not qualify for the installment sales
method.
106. Only one article, Treas. Reg. 45, art. 42, T.D. 2831, 21 Trees. Dec. Int. Rev. 170,
184-85 (1921), reprinted in 134 Reams, supra note 44, was devoted to personal property
sales.
107. One of the primary objectives of the 1918 installment regulations was to provide
relief for dealers in personal property. See Doyle, supra note 86, at 53-54. Personal property
sales by dealers in the ordinary course of business are subject to normal accrual rules and
not § 1001. The concept of casual sales of personal property did not become an express part
of the installment method of reporting until the codification of the installment method in
the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 9, 23 (current version codified at I.R.C. §
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The final and most important question is whether regulation
1.453-6(a)(1) establishes any additional authority for an accrual
basis taxpayer to accrue obligations of a purchaser at fair market
value rather than at face value. Section 1.453-6(a)(1) of the regula-
tions merely repeats the language of section 1001(b), so one can
argue that the regulation itself is not an authoritative source to
answer the question whether the fair market value rule of section
1001(b) applies to accrual basis taxpayers. An independent author-
itative interpretation of section 1.453-6(a)(1)'s predecessors does
exist, however, in the Service's early explanations of article 46.
A 1930 I.R.S. training manual on installment sales explained
how to report gains from deferred payment sales not on the install-
ment plan pursuant to article 46 of the 1926 and 1928 Revenue
Acts.'05 The manual presented an illustrative problem involving a
deferred payment sale by a real estate dealer whose "books are
kept on the accrual bases,"109 and stated that the seller's gain is
measured by "cash received plus the amount of the first mortgage
(assumed by the purchaser) plus the fair market value of the sec-
ond mortgage . . ... ,0 The manual further explained:
Assuming a case, where the property is not encumbered by
any mortgages, and the purchaser gives a first and second mort-
gage, the seller, in reporting profit in the year of sale, is privil-
eged to value the first trust as well as the second trust at their
current fair market values. Rarely, if ever, would the first mort-
gages in such instances have a value less than face value. 1 '
There are at least two reasons why the Treasury explicitly
made the fair market value rule applicable to real estate sales but
gave no indication as to the applicability of the rule to casual sales
of personal property. First, there was no regulation for casual sales
of personal property similar to article 46 for real property sales.1 12
Second, it appears that during the 1920's, the real estate industry
strongly lobbied for legislation permitting the reporting of deferred
payment sales of realty by the open transaction or cost recovery
453).
108. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T BuRnu OF INTERNAL REVENUE, INSTALLMENT SALES UNDER
THE REVENUE AcTs OF 1926 AND 1928 (1930), reprinted in 126 Reams, supra note 44.
Chapter five of this confidential training manual, beginning on page 34, discussed reporting
requirements for deferred payment sales not on the installment plan.
109. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 106-07.
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method. 13 Although the industry lost the battle for such legisla-
tion," 4 the lobbying effort resulted in a decision that accrual basis
sellers of realty could report purchasers' obligations at fair market
value."'
V. REVENUE RULING 79-292 AND DEFERRED REPORTING
A. Introduction
In Revenue Ruling 79-292, the Service takes theoretically in-
consistent positions with regard to income deferrals arising from
purchasers' obligations. The ruling asserts that for sales by accrual
basis taxpayers within the scope of section 1001(b), the taxpayer's
accounting method must be taken into account in determining the
amount realized. This position denies the taxpayer the opportunity
to defer the difference between the obligation's face and fair mar-
ket values. " O Concurrently, the Service denies open transaction
deferral to a cash basis taxpayer in a situation in which the pur-
113. See H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1927), reprinted in 98 Reams,
supra note 44; H.R. Doc. No. 139, 70th Cong., 1st Seas. 12-13 (1928) (letter from the Chair-
man of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation), reprinted in 98 Reams, supra
note 44; see also Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1927-1928, Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, Interim, 69th Cong.-70th Cong. 456 (1927) (amendment to the Revenue
Act of 1926 proposed by the Florida Institute of Accountants) [hereinafter cited as Florida
Accountants], reprinted in 8 Reams, supra note 44; Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925,
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 69th Cong., 1st Sees. 152 (1925) (statement
of Dr. Joseph J. Klein) [hereinafter cited as Klein], reprinted in 7 Reams, supra note 44;
Pinkerton, Deferred Payment Sales of Real Estate, 5 TAXES 47, 49-50 (1927).
114. See H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Seas. 15-16 (1927), reprinted in Reams, supra
note 44.
115. The motivation for the real estate industry's strong lobbying efforts in the 1920's
can be understood by reference to business and accounting practices during that period.
During boom times, such as those that existed in Florida and California during the 1920's,
speculative land developers would usually sell undeveloped real estate by contract. See D.
HERWITZ, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 306 (1976); Klein, supra note 113, at 152;
see also Florida Accountants, supra note 113, at 456-58; Pinkerton, supra note 113, at 49.
Accepted accounting rules allowed the face amount of the obligation to be accrued as in-
come even though many of the obligations later proved uncollectible. See Klein, supra note
113, at 153. There was, therefore, great incentive for a real estate dealer to keep his books
on the accrual basis. He could present an overstated income statement to potential inves-
tors, but for tax purposes only report the fair market value of the purchaser's obligation.
This technique would produce a partial deferral when the initial payment was too large to
qualify for installment reporting or when a taxpayer elected not to use the installment
method. The onset of the Great Depression and the end of the real estate boom, however,
may have caused a significant decline in the use of this method for reporting gains from
deferred payment sales. The decline in the use of this method may at least partially explain
the subsequent confusion over the applicability of article 46, and later § 1001(b), to accrual
taxpayers.
116. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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chaser's obligation is not a cash equivalent. Instead of allowing a
taxpayer to report gain in accordance with his accounting method,
the Service forces him to realize the fair market value of the
obligation."
7
The theoretical difficulty with the Service's respective treat-
ment of cash basis and accrual basis taxpayers arises from the Ser-
vice's inconsistency. The Service denies the cash basis taxpayer the
use of his accounting method in deferring income under section
1001(b), but the Service requires the accrual basis taxpayer to re-
port income in accordance with his accounting method. As previ-
ously demonstrated," 8 the historical development of section 1001
and its interpretive regulations indicate that the sounder interpre-
tation is that section 1001(b) operates independently of a tax-
payer's accounting method.
B. The Cash Equivalency Doctrine
The cash equivalency doctrine, in its broadest sense, allows a
cash basis taxpayer to exclude from income the value of any prop-
erty which cannot be readily converted into money."' This doc-
trine only applies to cash basis taxpayers; it should not operate for
sales transactions which fall within the scope of section 1001(b)
because the fair market value limitation of this section operates
independently of a taxpayer's accounting method. Thus, when ap-
plying the cash equivalency doctrine, it is essential to distinguish
between transactions governed by section 1001 and those which are
not. The courts have correctly applied the cash equivalency doc-
trine in non-sale"10 situations, but have erroneously applied the
doctrine in sale' situations.' 2 The Service, however, has correctly
117. See Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975), nonacq.
1981-2 C.B. 2 (nonacquiescence on another issue); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2),
T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 67-80, 85-100.
119. See Goldberg, supra note 20.
120. Transactions outside the scope of § 1001(b) are hereinafter referred to as "non-
sale" situations, and include sales of personal property in the ordinary course of business as
well as situations in which the taxpayer receives compensation for personal services or rent
or royalty income.
121. Transactions within the scope of § 1001(b) are hereinafter referred to as "sale"
situations, and include all sales of real property and casual sales of personal property. For
an analysis of the scope of section 1001(b), see supra text accompanying notes 32-44.
122. Compare Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961) (promise of
future royalty payments under an oil and gas lease may be equivalent to cash if obligor is
solvent and the promise is assignable, unconditional, not subject to set-offs, and not dis-
counted at a rate "substantially greater" than the prevailing market rate) with Ennis v.
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
recognized that the doctrine should only apply in non-sale situa-
tions," s as opposed to a sales context where section 1001(b) oper-
ates 'independently of a taxpayer's accounting method.1 24
In determining whether a purchaser's obligation is a cash
equivalent, the courts have applied a marketability standard.1"
One test of marketability used by the courts is whether the pur-
chaser's obligation can be transferred at a discount not substan-
tially greater than the prevailing premium for the use of money."'
The Service, however, does not support this deep discount test, as
evidenced by its position in Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner."
27
C. Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner
In Warren Jones, the Tax Court held that a cash basis seller's
receipt of a real estate contract with a face value substantially
greater than its fair market value was not the equivalent of cash
because of the deep discount necessary to convert it into cash. Ac-
cordingly, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer should not treat
the contract as an amount realized from the sale. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that under section
1001, the taxpayer realized the fair market value of the contract. 1 8
The court stated that it was unclear whether the Commissioner ar-
gued for a rejection of the deep discount test of cash equivalency,
or, more broadly, that the fair market value language of section
1001(b) operated independently of a taxpayer's accounting
method."' Because both arguments produced the same result for a
cash basis taxpayer, the court stated that it did not have to choose
between the two theories. 80
In Warren Jones the Commissioner advanced the argument
that the fair market value rule of section 1001(b) took precedence
over a taxpayer's accounting method, but did not make any con-
Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465 (1951) (contractual obligation for future payments by implica-
tion not a cash equivalent in sale situation only because contract was not marketable).
123. Rev. Rul. 68-606, 1968-2 C.B. 42 (non-sale royalty contract a cash equivalent if
transferable and readily saleable).
124. See Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, .524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975), nonacq.
1981-2 C.B. 2 (nonacquiescence on another issue); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2),
T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 308.
125. See, e.g., Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
126. Id. at 24; see also Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 663 (1973), rev'd,
524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975), nonacq. 1981-2 C.B. 2 (nonacquiescence on another issue).
127. 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).
128. Id. at 794.
129. Id. at 791 n.6.
130. Id.
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cessions that would undermine a similar application to accrual ba-
sis taxpayers. The Ninth Circuit devoted the bulk of its opinion to
an analysis of the legislative history of section 1001(b), although it
also made an attempt to reconcile its result with Cowden v. Com-
missioner.1"1 At issue in Cowden was the receipt of advance royalty
payments in the form of a deferred payment agreement related to
an oil and gas lease. The Commissioner, the Tax Court, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined
that the contractual obligation to make payments in future years
represented ordinary income subject to depletion; Cowden was
thus a non-sale case."' The Fifth Circuit stated that one condition
to finding that a purchaser's obligation is the equivalent of cash is
whether the holder of the obligation could transfer it "at a dis-
count not substantially greater than the generally prevailing pre-
mium for the use of money. . . .*"I" The Fifth Circuit thus estab-
lished a "deep discount" test for cash equivalency.
The Warren Jones court stated that its decision did not con-
flict with Cowden because the deep discount language used in
Cowden was merely "a description of the obligation involved in
that case" and was not meant to be a test of cash equivalency. 1"
The court of appeals was forced to adopt this strained interpreta-
tion of Cowden because it failed to recognize that Cowden was a
non-sale case, distinguishable on the basis of the inapplicability of
section 1001(b). The court's analysis of the legislative history of
section 1001(b) and its failure to recognize the section's inapplica-
bility in Cowden strongly indicate that the court did not reject the
deep discount test of the cash equivalency doctrine and that the
thrust of the Commissioner's argument was not directed toward
this narrow issue.
Thus, the Service takes inconsistent positions in Revenue Rul-
ing 79-292 and Warren Jones. In Revenue Ruling 79-292, the Ser-
vice seeks to tax accrual basis sellers on the basis of their account-
ing method, irrespective of section 1001(b)'s fair market value
language. But based on the holding in Warren Jones, the Service
also seeks to tax cash basis sellers under the language of section
131. 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
132. Id. at 21-22.
133. Id. at 24. Commentators have interpreted Cowden as establishing a deep discount
test for cash equivalency. See Herwitz, supra note 32, at 495; Comment, The Doctrine of
Cash Equivalency as Illustrated by Land Sale Contracts and Notes Received for Services
Rendered, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 219, 249 (1974).
134. 524 F.2d at 794 n.9.
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1001(b), notwithstanding their method of accounting.
As previously demonstrated, 8 the legislative history of sec-
tion 1001(b) indicates that the Warren Jones holding is correct.
Note that Revenue Ruling 79-292 did not discuss the legislative
history of section 1001(b), but the court in Warren Jones did.
The Warren Jones court traced the development of section
1001(b) from its inception in section 202(b) of the Revenue Act of
1918,131 through section 202(c) of the Revenue Act of 1921,1'7 and
into the pertinent parts of section 202(c) of the Revenue Act of
1924,188 which contained the present statutory language. The court
equated the "readily realizable market value" test of the 1921 Act
with the taxpayer's argument that the contract was not a cash
equivalent because of the deep discount. The court stated that
Congress's replacement of the "readily realizable market value"
test with the fair market value language of the 1924 Act evidenced
its intent "to establish the more definite rule for which the Com-
missioner here contends and that consequently, if the fair market
value of property received in an exchange can be ascertained, that
fair market value must be reported as an amount realized."189 The
Ninth Circuit noted that such an interpretation could work sub-
stantial hardship on a taxpayer by forcing him to sell the pur-
chaser's obligation in order to pay the tax imposed on the sale and,
more importantly, because the transaction was closed, the taxpayer
would only enjoy capital gain treatment to the extent that the fair
market value of the purchaser's obligation plus any cash received
exceeded his basis. Any amounts he collected in excess of the obli-
gation's fair market value would be taxable as ordinary income.14 0
The court reasoned that the installment method of reporting gains
under section 453 was "Congress's method of providing relief from
135. See supra text accompanying notes 67-80.
136. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1060 (1919), provided in part:
"When property is exchanged for other property, the property received in exchange shall for
the purpose of determining gain or loss be treated as the equivalent of cash to the amount
of its fair market value, if any . ... "
137. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230 provided in part: "For the
purposes of this title, on an exchange of property, real, personal or mixed, for any other
such property, no gain or loss shall be recognized unless the property received in exchange
has a readily realizable market value . ."
138. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202(c), 43 Stat. 253, 256 provided in part: "The
amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any
money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received."
139. 524 F.2d at 792.
140. Id.
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the rigors of section 1001(b)." 11
The court did not, however, extend its analysis of section
1001(b) to determine whether its legislative history supported a lit-
eral reading of the fair market value rule with respect to accrual
basis taxpayers. Because the court was not compelled to decide
whether a taxpayer's accounting method was subordinate to the
rule prescribed by section 1001(b), it produced an incomplete anal-
ysis of the legislative development of this section and its predeces-
sor statutes. Nonetheless, the court's holding that the fair market
value language of section 1001(b) operates independently of a cash
basis taxpayer's accounting method should be applied also to ac-
crual basis taxpayers.
D. Temporary Regulation Section 15A.453-1(d)(2)
In the tempo-ary regulations under the Installment Sales
Act," the Service asserts an internally inconsistent position. Sec-
tion 15A.453-1(d)(2)(i) of the temporary regulations first states
that "a taxpayer who elects not to report an installment sale on
the installment method must recognize gain on the sale in accor-
dance with the taxpayer's method of accounting. '14 The regula-
tion adds, however, that the receipt of an installment obligation
must be treated as a receipt of property in an amount equal to the
fair market value of the obligation, "whether or not such obligation
is the equivalent of cash.' ' 4 4 Section 15A.453-1(d)(2)(ii)(A) of the
temporary regulations states that "[u]nder no circumstances will
an installment sale for a fixed amount obligation be considered an
'open' transaction. '"4 5 The regulation then states that a cash basis
taxpayer must realize the fair market value of the obligation while
an accrual taxpayer must realize the face amount of the obligation
in the year of sale." 6
The temporary regulations clearly adopt the position in Reve-
nue Ruling 79-292 that a taxpayer's accounting method supersedes
the language of section 1001(b). The temporary regulations, how-
ever, just as clearly reject the applicability of the cash equivalency
doctrine to sales. These positions are contradictory in light of the
Service's and the courts' acceptance of cash equivalency as a valid
141. Id.
142. Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 227 (1980) (codified at I.R.C. § 453).
143. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(i), T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 308.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 15A.453-1(d)(2)(ii)(A).
146. Id.
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attribute of the cash method of accounting.1 47
Neither section 453, added by the Installment Sales Act, 148
nor the accompanying Senate Finance Committee Report1 49 gives
any indication that Congress intended to change the relationship
between section 1001(b) and a taxpayer's method of accounting.
The committee report does not state how accrual basis taxpayers,
who elect out of section 453, are to report gains from sales involv-
ing receipt of a purchaser's obligation. The report contains, how-
ever, what appears to be a rejection of the cash equivalency doc-
trine as applied to sales. It first states that open transaction
treatment should be even more limited under the Installment Sales
Act because installment reporting now applies to sales involving
contingent selling prices.1 50 The report concludes that open trans-
action treatment should be limited to Burnet v. Logan situa-
tions,' " and that "it is the Committee's intent that the cost-recov-
ery method not be available in the case of sales for a fixed price
(whether the seller's [sic] [buyer's] obligation is evidenced by a
note, contractual promise, or otherwise) . . . ."'5 The parentheti-
cal clause appears to be aimed at the cash equivalency doctrine.
The proper conclusions to be drawn from the Installment Sales Act
and the Senate Finance Committee Report are simply that Con-
gress did not address directly the section 1001(b) issue, unless one
can interpret the Senate Finance Committee's apparent rejection
of cash equivalency in sales situations as evidence that the fair
market rule of section 1001(b) supersedes a taxpayer's accounting
method.158
In temporary regulation 15A.453-1(d)(2)(ii), the Service at-
tempts to obtain the best of both possible worlds: it denies defer-
147. See Rev. Rul. 68-606, 1968-2 C.B. 42; see also Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d
20 (5th Cir. 1975); Schlemmer v. United States, 94 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1938); Kniffen v. Com-
missioner, 39 T.C. 553 (1962); Williams v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1000 (1957).
148. Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 227 (1980).
149. S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4696.
150. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 149, at 24. Prior to the Installment Sales Act, the
courts had held that the selling price had to be fixed and determinable to qualify the sale
for installment reporting under § 453(b). See, e.g., Gralapp v. United States, 458 F.2d 1158
(10th Cir. 1972).
151. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
152. See S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 149, at 24.
153. The committee likely did not have a firm grasp of the relationship among deferred
reporting, cash equivalency, § 1001(b), and a taxpayer's accounting method. The committee
report contains a misstatement of the law with its apparent limitation of the applicability of
the Burnet v. Logan open transaction treatment to cash basis taxpayers. S. REP. No. 1000,
supra note 149, at 23.
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rals for accrual basis taxpayers because the operation of section
1001(b) depends upon a taxpayer's accounting method, and it de-
nies deferrals for cash basis taxpayers because section 1001(b) op-
erates independently of a taxpayer's accounting method. The Ser-
vice may justify its position as an attempt to induce both accrual
basis taxpayers and cash basis taxpayers to report under the in-
stallment method and thereby report consistently. But to the ex-
tent that a taxpayer elects out of the installment method, the regu-
lations present an internally inconsistent position.
Given the legislative history of section 1001(b) and the Ser-
vice's position in Warren Jones, the Service should recognize that
the fair market value language of section 1001(b) operates irrespec-
tive of a taxpayer's accounting method. In the alternative, if the
Service maintains the position in Revenue Ruling 79-292 that ac-
counting method controls the amount realized under section
1001(b), then it should allow a cash basis taxpayer to use the
deferral provided by the cash equivalency doctrine. 54
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in Revenue Ruling 79-292 that accrual basis tax-
payers must report the face amount of a purchaser's obligation
under section 1001(b) receives only minimal support from the au-
thorities it cites. Additionally, the holding does not comport with
either Congress's intent to have section 1001(b) operate indepen-
dently of the taxpayer's method of accounting. This intent is evi-
denced by the legislative development of section 1001(b) and the
application of section 1001(b)'s original regulations to the receipt
of a purchaser's obligation as initially interpreted by the Service.
The temporary regulations under the Installment Sales Act
adopt reporting rules for cash and accrual basis taxpayers that re-
sult in inconsistent applications of section 1001(b). Congress did
not, however, directly address the section 1001(b) issue in the Act.
Although the Senate Finance Committee Report does contain a
statement that appears to prohibit the use of the cash equivalency
doctrine, neither the Installment Sales Act itself, nor the accompa-
nying committee report contains any language which provides a
basis for the temporary regulation's requirement that accrual tax-
payers accrue the face amount of a purchaser's obligation.
If Revenue Ruling 79-292 and the accrual rule adopted in the
temporary regulations do correctly interpret section 1001(b), then
154. See Goldberg, supra note 20.
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cash method taxpayers have a strong argument that the cash
equivalency doctrine applies to sales under section 1001(b), con-
trary to the result in Warren Jones, the Senate Finance Commit-
tee Report, and the cash method rule in Temporary Regulation
section 15A.453-1(d)(2)(i).
